

Abstracts

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Concurrent Sessions

Acar, Hatice (University of Glasgow)

The Need For A New Philosophical Discipline: The Philosophy of Success

[**Keywords:** success, philosophy of success, ethics of competition, ethics of cooperation]

In this conference presentation, I will propose the creation of a new philosophical field, which I call the "Philosophy of Success," to address the complex and multifaceted nature of success. I argue that forming this field is essential for understanding the concept of success beyond superficial measures like wealth, fame, and power. The philosophy of success would allow us to critically examine what it truly means to succeed and the various ethical, historical, and social dimensions that influence this concept.

My argument is structured around six core reasons for establishing this discipline. First, there is an inherent ambiguity in the definition of success, as it can vary widely depending on cultural, personal, and societal values. Second, the notion of success is historically relative; what is considered successful in one era may be viewed quite differently in another. Third, social context plays a crucial role in shaping how success is perceived and achieved, as societal norms and expectations influence individual definitions of success.

Fourth, I explore the importance of alliances and cooperative dynamics on the road to success, recognizing that most accomplishments are supported by a network of relationships and collaborative efforts. Fifth, I examine the ethical implications of competition, as individuals often encounter zero-sum games that may disadvantage certain groups based on gender, race, or class. Lastly, I argue that the philosophy of success deserves its own status as a distinct field within philosophy, working alongside ethics, social philosophy, and political philosophy to deepen our understanding of success and guide ethical pathways to achievement.

Through this exploration, I hope to lay the groundwork for a discipline that offers layered insights into success, fostering both growth and a more equitable society.

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Aird, Rory (University of Glasgow)

Hedging, bullshitting, and hedged bullshitting

[**Keywords:** hedging; bullshitting; bullshit; deception; assertion]

A bullshit assertion is classically characterised as being uncoupled from truth or falsity. A hedged assertion (e.g., p, I think), on the other hand, is explicitly connected to the alethic. Prima facie, then, bullshitting and hedging are mutually exclusive. And yet, bullshitters seem to hedge their bullshit all

the time. I explore this puzzle and argue that the existence of hedged bullshitting constitutes a potent counterexample to the majority of extant bullshitting accounts. I then show that, despite the apparent incompatibility, hedging can uniquely assuage key vulnerabilities associated with consummate bullshitting, thus making hedged bullshitting a phenomenon of crucial social import – it is the superlative form of bullshitting.

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Bajaj, Sameer (University of Warwick)

Distributing Democratic Labor

[**Keywords:** *Voting; Democracy; Fair Shares; Reciprocity; Holism*]

The idea that there is a moral duty to vote is widely accepted in democratic thought. Critics argue that because many non-voting acts can promote good outcomes, there cannot be a duty to vote as opposed to promoting good outcomes in other ways.

Recently, several authors have developed a partially concessive reply, which argues that while there is no special duty to vote, there is a discretionary duty to do one's fair share of the political labor needed to promote good political outcomes.

This essay has three main aims. First, it critically examines the most sophisticated defense of the fair shares account. Brookes Brown's reciprocity theory holds that individuals must reciprocate the benefits they receive from others' contributions to public goods schemes by contributing themselves (Brown 2020; 2024). I argue that the reciprocity theory fails for reasons that show fair shares political duties cannot be grounded solely in the benefits duty-bearers receive but must also depend on the interests of potential beneficiaries.

Second, the essay develops a novel theory of fair shares political duties, which I call the holism theory. I argue that democratic elections provide a unique opportunity to advance welfare and justice in a holistic way that accounts for the full range of human needs and treats each person's needs as equally important. Citizens thus have a duty to do their fair share of promoting good electoral outcomes and retain discretion in choosing how to do so.

Third, the essay advances a novel "bootstrapping argument" for a moral duty to vote. Once individuals possess the knowledge and motivation to meet their fair share of electoral obligations, voting becomes an easy contribution that can be required, even if it exceeds one's original fair share. Hence, an imperfect fair shares duty can ground, by bootstrapping, a perfect duty to vote.

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Begon, Jessica (Durham University)

Don't Worry About Me: Paternalism, Authority, and Relationships

[**Keywords:** *Paternalism, autonomy, relationships*]

This paper makes three claims about paternalism. First, I offer a conceptual account of what paternalism is, without specifying its permissibility: interference (broadly construed), without consent, and with a benevolent motive. Second, I defend a structural account of why paternalism is wrong, when it is: invoking someone's good as a reason for action without authority fails to show the intended beneficiary appropriate respect. This approach has been criticised on the basis that if each individual has authority over their own good, no non-consensual benevolent intervention (paternalism) will ever be permissible. Thus, I turn to the main focus of the paper: offering a substantive (though partial) account of when paternalism is wrong, by determining when and why others might acquire authority to invoke our good. My central claim is that individuals have the authority to determine who can invoke their good as a reason, but that others may acquire the presumptive authority to invoke it. Further, identifying when this is so will not depend simply on features of the choice (how voluntary it is) but on features of the wider context – in particular, the relationship between paternaliser and paternalisee. As such, paternalism can be permissible, but it will rarely be the case that all potential paternalists possess identical degrees of authority: our relationship to our paternaliser is crucial.

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Ben, Patrick (The University of Manchester)

Why It's Your Complementary Obligation: An African Response to Sinnott-Armstrong's Defence of Inconsequentialism

[**Keywords:** *Inconsequentialism; individual moral obligation; collective harm problems; complementary obligation; Complementarity*]

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong rejects individual moral obligation for collective harm problems on two grounds: (1) the insufficiency of individual contribution to overall collective harm – that is, inconsequentialism – and (2) the lack of intention to cause harm. I reject this position as morally problematic and propose a novel approach to collective harm problems grounded on the Principle of Complementarity (PoC). My approach motivates individual moral obligation to act in collective harm cases based on an African idea of Complementarity – call this complementary obligation. Then, I demonstrate that complementary obligation grounded on the PoC provides an alternative and more defensible justification for individual moral obligation to act in collective harm cases. Finally, I anticipate and respond to two possible objections to my complementary approach to the problem of inconsequentialism.

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Bennett, Christopher (University of Sheffield)

Guilt as an Expressive Emotion

[**Keywords:** *Emotion; guilt; expressive action; practical reasons; normative ethics*]

This paper introduces the idea of an 'expressive emotion.' An emotion is expressive, if it is best explained by reference to an expressive action. An expressive action is an action that has expressive properties that relate to the significance of a situation, and which is performed to mark the situation as in some way extraordinary (Bennett 2016; 2021; 2022).

Why might one think that there are emotions that are best explained by reference to an expressive action? I will argue for four main conclusions about expressive emotions:

1. They are emotions for which the conditions of fittingness specified by the emotion's formal object are shared with the conditions of appropriateness (in a sense to be explained) of an expressive action.
2. They are emotions the phenomenology of which is best explained by reference to an expressive action.
3. They are emotions the psychological role of which is the same as that of expressive actions, namely, to lift situations out of the mundane and mark them as in some way extraordinary.
4. They are emotions for which there can be non-instrumental reasons; and the nature of such reasons is best explained by reference to an expressive action.

I will argue that the expressive theory gives a better explanation than rival theories of how emotions are to be individuated; in what their unity consists; and how there can be non-instrumental reasons for emotions.

I do not claim that the expressive theory applies to everything that is called 'emotion.' Emotions that I am interested in include pride, shame, guilt, joy, disappointment, awe – these and others I will argue should be classified as expressive emotions. In this paper I focus on the emotion of guilt, arguing that it is best understood in relation to the expressive action of dissociation (from wrongdoing).

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Berrotaran, Alejandro (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Rethinking Taxation: A New Institutional Conception of Private Property Rights

[**Keywords:** *distributive justice - private property – taxation*]

Our perspective on taxation depends crucially on the conception of private property rights we adopt. The pre-institutional conception (Epstein, 1985; Mack, 2002) holds that moral private property rights exist prior to and independently of public institutions, while the institutional conception (Murphy and Nagel, 2002) argues that public institutions are necessary to justify such rights.

Both views, as formulated to date, have faced significant criticism. The pre-institutional conception has been challenged for failing to adequately consider the implications of private property relations. Why would non-owners accept the unilateral imposition of a duty to refrain from using the owner's property without any public institution to offset the disadvantages caused by this duty? The institutional view, on the other hand, has also been criticized, both for not giving convincing arguments to justify the institutional character of private property rights and for stripping these rights of any normative force to limit state power.

This paper proposes a new institutional conception of private property rights that overcomes the critiques against prevailing views on property rights. Drawing on a Kantian-Rawlsian framework, I argue for two claims. First, that private property rights can only be morally justified within an institutional framework that ensures their reciprocal acceptability. Such acceptability is achievable only through public institutions, including taxation, that distribute the benefits of private property to ensure the least advantaged have a social minimum to meet their basic interests. Second, that more ambitious redistributive policies do not necessarily infringe upon private property rights. Building on Rawls' (1999) theory of justice, I claim that a just distribution of property must maximally benefit the least advantaged while guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties and fair equality of opportunity. When such distribution is achieved, private property rights impose a limit on the taxing authority of the State.

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Bespalov, Andrei (Pompeu Fabra University)

Civility and Implicit Bias in Public Justification

[**Keywords:** *civic respect; interpretive charity; polarization; public reason*]

Public reason liberals hold that showing respect for fellow citizens as free and equal partners in self-government requires political decision-makers to publicly justify their policy preferences in ways that make them reasonably acceptable to all citizens. I argue that this duty of civility prohibits publicly attributing the positions of one's political opponents to their implicit biases, understood as preferences grounded in stereotypes and prejudices that can be registered only indirectly and are difficult to control. That is because showing civic respect for individuals is incompatible with discrediting their political reasoning as a mere rationalization of hidden phobias and desires for domination, be they truly unconscious or simply unacknowledged. The exclusion of implicit bias arguments from the pool of proper public reasons is not conducive to partisan ideological intransigence. On the contrary, it deprives the parties of convenient pretexts for misinterpreting one another's arguments, remaining unresponsive to them, and evading reciprocity in public justification.

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Brandt, Reuven (UC San Diego)

How Not to Solve the Non-Identity Problem

[**Keywords:** *non-identity; reproduction; disability; ethics;*]

The aim of this paper is two-fold. The first is to show that recent strategies employed to solve the non-identity problem put forward by Robert Noggle and Erik Magnusson do not succeed. Both authors attempt to solve the non-identity problem by arguing that procreators must be reasonably assured that their prospective children will have certain goods for any instance of reproduction to be permissible. They then show that paradigmatic non-identity cases violate these conditions. The supposed upshot is that the non-identity problem need not force us to accept an extremely liberal view of reproductive permissibility.

However, I argue that this approach cannot solve the non-identity problem. Establishing such minimum standards cannot provide a general account of when and why it seems impermissible to

create a child with poor prospects when there is little cost to instead creating a child with better prospects. This is because in many non-identity cases both possible children we might choose to bring into existence have lives that contains goods in excess of the plausible minimal thresholds necessary to renders reproduction permissible.

The second aim of the paper is to defend a different solution to the non-identity problem. I argue that appeals to impersonal wrongdoing are not necessarily the boogeyman that some (eg. David Boonin) make them out to be. Drawing from Ross' account of justice I argue that the wrongdoing in non-identity cases is that, given present conditions, choosing to create a disadvantaged child is likely to bring us further away from a world in which benefits are distributed in proportion to merit.

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Braun, Esther (University of Oxford)

Assisted dying, poverty, and state coercion

[**Keywords:** *bioethics; autonomy; coercion; assisted dying; injustice*]

Recently, several cases of people with disabilities or chronic illnesses who requested assisted dying because of poverty, unmet housing and care needs have been reported from Canada. The respective agents have stated that their requests are not rooted in their medical conditions per se but rather in their inability to access appropriate housing or care – if a functional welfare state were to provide the needed resources, they would not request assisted dying. It has recently been argued that although tragic and unjust, such requests are autonomous and should be respected, as restricting the respective agents' choices further would be unjustifiably paternalistic.

In this paper, I argue against this position. I stress that not all people living under oppressive circumstances should be deemed non-autonomous. Yet, a failure of the state to provide necessary resources to people with disabilities – while providing them with the option to request dying – can be regarded as a form of coercion. Acceding to requests for assisted dying motivated by poverty therefore does not promote autonomy.

However, this should not be regarded as a reason to prohibit assisted dying altogether. The upshot of my argument is rather that the voluntariness of requests for assisted dying must be carefully assessed. Moreover, states like Canada must urgently address their failure to provide basic resources to people with disabilities and chronic illnesses to avoid coercing them into requesting assisted dying.

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Calado Barbosa, Eduarda (State University of Campinas)

How to counter toxic speech by changing the conversation

[**Keywords:** *Toxic speech; counterspeech; epistemic friction; Sarcasm; Rephrasing; QUD.*]

Lately, pessimism has dominated the literature on in situ counterspeech. Scholars that endorse the Lewisian scorekeeping model, in particular, have argued that talking back at toxic speakers is a risky strategy that tends to backfire due to how the salience of negative associations (involving targeted groups) impacts cognition and discourse structure. Here, I intend to put this pessimism into question and argue that talking back is (still) a viable option to counter hate speech, provided only that resistant hearers aim to alter conversational goals, enabling changes in salience facts in the process. In the view I will advocate, this amounts to felicitously altering the question under discussion (the QUD, henceforth) at the time of the utterance. I will focus on examples of two ways in which this can be done: via sarcastic responses and by rephrasing the toxic speaker. In the former, the resistant hearer changes the QUD by rejecting the proposed inquisitive joint plan, and, in the latter, the QUD can be altered within the same joint plan in ways that ameliorate it. The transformative potential of each strategy will be key to the intuitive assessment of their merits and their foreseen social costs will guide concerns with efficiency. I will begin with a summary of the salience-related problems that

seem to affect challenges used as counterspeech. I then move on to discuss strategies that prevent the consolidation of toxic QUDs. More specifically, I first lay out some elements of Craige Robert's QUD framework, and thereafter, explore them to advance my account of the discursive effects of sarcasm and rephrasing. Finally, I will analyze the comparative merits and deficits of these two strategies.

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Cavaliere, Giulia (Philosophy, University College London)

Procreation and the duty to adopt: Are duties to rescue really enough?

[**Keywords:** adoption; procreation; duty to rescue; duty to adopt;]

Some philosophers contend that people who wish to have children have a pro tanto duty to adopt existing children rather than create new children (see, for instance, (Friedrich, 2013; Rulli, 2016)). They derive this duty from a general duty to rescue or to assist those in need, according to which we are morally required to save agents from death or serious harm if it is in our power to do so “without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance” (cf. (Singer, 1972)). In this paper, I challenge some of the empirical and normative assumptions underlying defences of the duty to adopt. First, I argue that it is wrong to conflate ‘parentless children’ with ‘children in need of adoption’. While it is true that some children who are not parentless may have better lives with adoptive parents than their biological parents, it is unclear that this is always the case –a view that both Friedrich and Rulli take to be uncontroversial. Indeed, it is unclear that the harms associated with transnational adoption and displacement always outweigh the harms associated with being raised in adverse conditions by either the child’s biological parents or other relevant members of her community (broadly constructed). I defend this claim by drawing on the empirical literature on transnational adoption. Second, ordinarily, in complex moral and practical states of affairs (unlike Railroad but like adoption), we need to take into account several considerations, which defenders of the duty to adopt fail to engage with. As a result, their arguments are much weaker and much less widely applicable than they contend. More specifically, I argue that the inference from the intuition that we are required to rescue the child in Railroad to the view that we are morally required to adopt children instead of creating new children is unwarranted.

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Cesarano, Francesca (University of Frankfurt)

Defining Patriarchal Bargains as Double Binds

[**Keywords:** Patriarchal Bargains - Double Binds - Oppressive Norms - Responsibility - Structural Injustice]

In feminist philosophy, much attention has been given to women’s compliance with oppressive gender norms. Yet, patriarchal bargains are rarely studied as a normatively significant way of engaging with gender norms in its own right, especially in the context of broader debates on feminist collective struggles for structural change. This paper seeks to address this gap by pursuing two overarching objectives:

- I. To refine the concept of PBs and identify the circumstances under which they can serve as a coping mechanism for oppression, while remaining compatible with either a forward-looking political responsibility or a backward-looking moral responsibility to resist structural injustice.
- II. To show how PBs can also inform discussions about how to conceptualize responsibility for structural injustice – particularly with respect to the issue of how women – and more broadly, members of oppressed groups - are often blamed for being complicit with the systems that oppress them.

The paper proceeds as follows:

In Â§1, I define PBs as a specific subset of oppressive double binds, adopting Hirji’s definition of double binds (Hirji 2021). In Â§2, I examine two ways of understanding and evaluating the bargaining agent’s complicity with oppression, which results in two ways of conceptualizing responsibility for structural injustice: forward-looking political responsibility (Young 2011) and backward-looking moral responsibility (Sangiovanni 2018). In Â§3, I address the practical concerns in relation to backward-

looking moral responsibility and PBs, also drawing some insights into the broader discussion on responsibility for structural injustice.

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Cossette-Lefebvre, Hugo (McGill University)

Human and AI beliefs: cut from the same cloth?

[**Keywords:** *Applied Ethics of AI; Doxastic Wrongs; Blameworthiness; Beliefs; (Dis)Respect for Persons*]

This paper explores whether artificial intelligence (AI) systems can commit doxastic wrongs – wrongs inherent in the formation of beliefs. While doxastic wrongs by human agents are relatively well established in the literature, whether an AI system’s beliefs can wrong individuals remains controversial. I argue that AI systems can doxastically wrong persons; as AI systems are integrated in our socio-political relationships, the beliefs they form can be disrespectful by, for instance, being based on racist or sexist prejudices.

The argument is divided into three steps. First, I adopt a broadly functionalist and dispositionalist account of beliefs to highlight that some AI systems can form and hold beliefs. Second, I build on the literature on doxastic wrongs to argue that the beliefs of AI systems should be subject to moral evaluation for the same reason human beliefs are: beliefs play a constitutive role in shaping interpersonal and socio-political relationships. I argue that it is a mistake to presume that AI systems cannot commit doxastic wrongs or be held morally responsible because they lack moral agency. AI systems can be blameworthy for holding certain beliefs when those beliefs can be properly attributed to them and when they violate “ought-to-be norms” – standards governing how AI systems should be designed to respect the moral standing of persons. Third, I consider the practical implications of this conclusion. While both AI and human beliefs can be morally wrong for similar reasons, key differences require careful consideration. AI systems are designed and controlled by humans. This imposes unique responsibilities on designers to ensure that their AI systems respect ought-to-be norms, which are contextually determined.

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Cutas, Daniela (Lund University)

Is there an interest in becoming a grandparent?

[**Keywords:** *interest in becoming a parent; interest in becoming a grandparent; grandparenthood; grandparents; grandchildren; intrafamilial reproduction*]

Do parents have an interest in becoming grandparents – and if so, which claims does this interest generate against other parties (such as offspring, healthcare professionals, or the state), if any?

While the interest in becoming a parent has been discussed extensively in reproductive and family ethics in recent years, grandparents and grandparenthood have been at best marginal in this growing literature. In this talk, I explore a possible path towards conceptualising an interest in becoming a grandparent and the degree to which it could ground a claim to facilitate its fulfilment.

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Davies, Ben (University of Sheffield)

Distributive responsibility

[**Keywords:** *responsibility; distributive justice; medical ethics; resource allocation*]

The idea of individual responsibility playing a part in healthcare allocation is controversial, and subject to a long list of objections (Sharkey and Gillam 2010). This talk focuses on one objection in particular: holding patients responsible for their health-affecting behaviours is unacceptably moralising. Call this The Moralisation Objection (MO).

The standard version of MO rests on an error about responsibility. MO presumes that to hold someone responsible is necessarily to regard them as blameworthy – examples of such reasoning can be found in several recent publications arguing against the relevance of responsibility in healthcare (Hurst 2024; Kennett 2024; Nath 2024; Shaw 2024). But this is not the conception of

responsibility that is typically at play in arguments in favour of responsibility-sensitive health allocation. Rather, what is typically appealed to is a conception of what I call distributive responsibility.

Distributive responsibility is familiar from political philosophy but neglected in medical ethics. It is a form of responsibility: it links one's obligations to bear costs, and rights to enjoy benefits, to one's intentional actions under certain circumstances. However, it is non-moral. Indeed, more broadly, it has no necessary relation to any ideas of praise or blame, including non-moral ones: one's distributive responsibility is not essentially affected by the prudential or epistemic quality of one's choices any more than by their moral quality. An example of this might be my decision to gamble, with my own money, in a casino. To say that it is I –and not you, say –who should shoulder the costs of losing a bet does not imply that I do something morally or prudentially blameworthy when I gamble.

Thus, I suggest that an important strand of applied ethics has neglected a central insight from political philosophy, at significant cost to the coherence of the debate about responsibility-sensitive allocation.

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Debrabander, Jasper (University of Bologna)

Engaging with the normative aspects of validation research in the health sciences: a case study

[**Keywords:** Decision-making, validation research, concordance measures, autonomy]

Measurement in the health sciences is both ubiquitous and high-stakes. It is central to clinical practice as well as health research. It should come as no surprise, then, that the validation of measurement instruments in the health sciences is extensively discussed in the scientific literature and many guiding documents have been developed. Nevertheless, the scientific literature on how measurement instruments in the health sciences should be validated is not without philosophical critique. For example, Anna Alexandrova has pointed out that the normative aspects of validation are often not adequately dealt with, which might result in value-inapt measurement instruments. In this talk, I will perform a case study on concordance measures to investigate how ethical theories can be brought to bear on the validation of measurement instruments in the health sciences. To that end, I first introduce Alexandrova's three-pronged Implicit Logic of Validation to identify several normative aspects of validation. Thereafter, I explore how different ethical theories might enable us to engage with these normative aspects of validation research in the health sciences. I show that different theories of authenticity and autonomy have been ignored while developing and validating a concordance measure (i.e. BCS-DQI), but could have challenged the construct definition as much as the context and content of validation research.

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Dore-Horgan, Emma (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

"Give Me a Human Please": The Moral Right to Human Encounters in the Smart Technology Age

[**Keywords:** Moral Rights; Automation; Smart Technologies; Respect for Persons; Human Sociality]

A customer jokes with the barista preparing their coffee. A nursing home resident converses with the nurse dispensing their daily medication. Two acquaintances chatter as they wait for the bus. These casual yet regular encounters are typically important to us, but our ability to enjoy them is increasingly under threat. Our societies are gradually outsourcing various customer-facing jobs to robotics and artificial intelligence (A.I.). Many now work remotely. And when we meet other persons in shared public spaces, we often remain crouched over our screens rather than opening ourselves to the possibility of a human encounter with them.

This talk argues that persons have a pro tanto (i.e., defeasible) moral right to human encounters, understood as both a claim-right against automated encounters in certain domains (Right A), and a claim-right to a minimally adequate set of casual social interactions that are free from technological interruption and immersion (Right B). My defence of this claim is respect-based. I argue that the imperative to respect persons grounds a pro tanto directed duty – on the part of governments, industry etc. – to refrain from supplanting humans with automated agents in domains and contexts where social interaction characteristically plays an important role. I also argue that this imperative to

respect persons means that individual persons have a duty, owed to others, to attend to them free from technological distraction/immersion when interacting with them, owing others an apology and redress when failing to do so.

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Flynn, Jennifer (Memorial University) **Smith, Max** (Western University) and **Skelton, Anthony** (Western University)

The Ethics of Twin Pregnancy Reduction

[Keywords: *pregnancy reduction; abortion; twin pregnancy reduction; reproduction; reproductive ethics*]

Fertility treatments have contributed in recent years to an overall increase in multifetal pregnancies. With this has come the prospect of pregnancy reduction, which involves reducing the number of fetuses a pregnant person carries by having one or more fetuses terminated. There exists a vast and comprehensive literature on the morality of abortion. However, there is very little literature devoted specifically to the ethics of pregnancy reduction.

The lack of literature on the morality of fetal reductions might be due to the fact that reductions are not, morally speaking, essentially different than abortion. But not all seem to think that is the case. Our paper seeks to determine whether there are clear moral differences between twin reduction (the reduction of a twin to a singleton pregnancy) and abortion. We do this through the lens provided by three central and important contributions to the literature on the ethics of abortion –contributions by Judith Jarvis Thomson, Susan Sherwin, and Margaret Little.

The paper has four sections. Each of sections One, Two, and Three is dedicated to one of these three positions. In each case we assess how key aspects of the view might handle the issue of twin reduction. This assists in making sense of the differences between singleton abortion and twin reductions that some seem to think exist, while clarifying whether twin reductions introduce moral considerations unique from those raised by abortion.

In the fourth section, we consolidate our findings, and return to the potential concerns with twin reductions mentioned at the outset. While the shift to the twin reductions context is not straightforward for any of the views, our analyses do not reveal any clear moral differences between abortion and twin reduction. They leave unsubstantiated moral concerns about twin reduction on the parts of those who agree with basic abortion rights.

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Forsberg, Lisa (University of Oxford)

Vaccination, purpose, and permissibility

[Keywords: *vaccination; consent; bodily integrity; public health; criminal justice*]

There is a widespread assumption that vaccination should be voluntary, that is, that recipients' consent is required ('the consent assumption'). In this paper, I argue against the consent assumption, by considering an argument that has been made in respect of interventions employing medical means for crime-prevention. According to this argument, which I call the Argument from Purpose, the acceptance of a consent requirement in respect of such interventions assumes they are best understood as primarily (standard, therapeutic) medical interventions whose permissibility should be assessed against the standards of medical ethics, rather than interventions whose permissibility should be assessed against the standards of criminal justice ethics. This assumption relies on a mismatch between purpose and permissibility norms that requires justification. I consider a parallel argument, namely that the acceptance of a consent requirement in respect of vaccination assumes that vaccination is best understood as a primarily (standard, therapeutic) medical intervention whose permissibility should be assessed against the standards of medical ethics, rather than an intervention whose permissibility should be assessed against the standards of public health ethics for public protective interventions. I consider four objections to the Argument from Purpose applied to vaccination: (i) that a consent requirement remains in place for vaccination, regardless of purpose, because vaccination interferes with our bodies; (ii) that the Argument from Purpose mischaracterises the nature and purpose of vaccination; (iii) that the Argument from Purpose mischaracterises the

permissibility norms for public protective interventions in public health; and (iv) that the analogy with criminal justice on which the Argument from Purpose applied to vaccination rests does not hold. I argue that all four objections either fail or have a much narrower reach than suggested. I end by considering some implications of my arguments.

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Fox, Carl (University of Leeds)

Augmented Reality, Public Statues, and the Principle of Gratitude

[**Keywords:** Statues; Augmented Reality; Gratitude; Public Art]

In the relatively near future, augmented reality technology may allow users to change what they see as they go about their daily lives by overlaying and obscuring physical objects in the world with, essentially, whatever images they like. In this paper, I am interested in how this technology might be deployed to effectively seal oneself off from a particular form of state speech – statues and other works of commemorative public art. I will defend the position that, generally, it is wrong to cut oneself off from state speech in this way, but why should that be so? And what distinguishes this use of future technology from how we currently use headphones, phones, and other devices that also reduce our availability to outside stimuli?

I will apply an idea from the literature on political obligation, that by receiving benefits we can incur debts of gratitude. Public spaces offer a range of benefits, and I will argue that, other things being equal, enjoying them can establish a weak obligation to the state for providing them. I will then argue that the appropriate way to discharge this obligation is to remain open to the state's attempts to use art in those public spaces to communicate with us about its fundamental values. On my view, in the absence of a suitable justification, it is wrong to use augmented reality to completely obscure public statues in one's field of vision, and, further, the state is entitled to take at least some steps to regulate the development, distribution, and use of technology in order to discourage this practice. Finally, I will consider the implications of relying on the principle of gratitude in this way for states, what it means for the provision and governance of public spaces, and how it bears on debates about contested monuments.

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Frowe, Helen (Stockholm University)

Not Just About the Sex: Systematically Deceptive Relationships and the Law

[**Keywords:** Deception; Manipulation; Autonomy; Legal Philosophy; Sexual Ethics]

The revelation that undercover British police officers engaged in long-term intimate relationships under their assumed identities has met with widespread outcry, triggering a public inquiry and substantial compensation payments from the Metropolitan Police. The involvement of state actors might make these cases especially egregious. But such Systematically Deceptive Relationships (SDRs), as I will call them, are far from the exclusive domain of 'spy cops'. In her book *Fake*, the journalist Stephanie Wood describes the unravelling of her own partner's extensive deceptions of her, along with numerous similar deceptions perpetrated by other men against other women. After her book was published, Wood was inundated with emails from women who, like her, had discovered that their long-term relationship was, essentially, a fabrication created by their partner through deliberate, pervasive, and systematic deception.

Historically, bigamy laws helped to deter at least some sorts of SDRs. But while our changing social norms regarding cohabitation and divorce have decreased the chances of ending up in a bigamous relationship, they have simultaneously increased the chances of ending up in a SDR. This talk defends a pluralist account of the wrongness of SDRs, looking beyond the wrong of nonconsensual sex that often preoccupies existing discussions. I argue that when the harms of SDRs pass a threshold, there is pro tanto reason to criminalise their infliction. I then consider whether such legislation can avoid overcriminalising deception in intimate relationships.

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Gopal, William (University of Glasgow)

Large Language Models and Testimonial Injustice

[**Keywords:** *Testimonial Injustice, Artificial Intelligence, Large Language Models, Anthropomorphism*]

Recently, testimonial injustice (TI) has been applied to AI systems, such as decision-making-support systems and large-language-models (LLMs) within healthcare (Byrnes, 2023; Proost, 2023; Walmsley, 2023), the COMPAS recidivism algorithm (Symons, 2022), and generative AI models (Kay, 2024). Extant accounts of algorithmic TI identify the morally problematic epistemic issue as being when the user of an AI system mistakenly assumes an AI system is epistemically advantaged in contrast to another human, such that they're assigned a credibility deficit – call these Mistaken Assumption Accounts. Given recent technical advancements of LLMs and high levels of use amongst the general public, I focus on how algorithmic TI emerges in quotidian uses of LLMs, such as ChatGPT.

In the *pars destruens*, I offer counterexamples to Mistaken Assumption Accounts, highlighting their extensional inadequacy. In the *pars construens*, I provide an alternative which fares better: Undue Acknowledgement as Testifier. I argue that (i) when an LLM is taken to be a genuine member of minimally equal standing to humans in an epistemic community, an LLM is assigned a credibility excess such that a human suffers a credibility deficit, (ii) these credibility assessments are driven by implicit comparative credibility assessments based on the anthropomorphised “identity” of an LLM, and (iii) identity prejudice influences these credibility assessments. To achieve this, I draw upon work in human-computer-interaction and feminist science and technology studies to show how user-experience design and the current social imaginary of AI contributes to algorithmic TI. Consequently, this paper shifts the current focus in the literature from a discussion of how the proposed conditions for TI obtain emerge from issues of bias within training data or the opacity of AI systems, to how the interactive relationships between humans and LLMs enable TI.

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Grill, Kalle (Umeå University)

Non-discrimination as a filter on reasons

[**Keywords:** *Direct discrimination; filter on reasons; group properties; motives and justifications.*]

Contrary to the established view, discrimination is not differential disadvantageous treatment motivated or justified by certain group properties. It is being influenced by such properties in one's deliberation or motivational processes, conscious or unconscious. The treatment that often results from these processes may still be thought of as discriminatory, but only in a derived sense. Discrimination proper takes place in our minds, as we consider how to treat others and are moved to treat them one way or other.

This approach to understanding discrimination is not moralized, but it is motivated by moral considerations. For example, aversion to an applicant because she is a woman may not be sufficiently strong to outweigh her superior qualification, and racist motives may be held in check by social pressure so as not to materialize in action. Whether or not they lead to action, these attitudes should not influence our motivation or deliberation. In a useful metaphor, non-discrimination positions and principles can be described as filters on what properties may justifiably operate as reasons for us when we treat someone worse than others.

The main reason for this filter approach is conceptual clarity, which in turn facilitates the formulation of specific and plausible normative principles and positions. Filters can be specified along the dimensions of reason kinds, reason content, action alternatives, social roles or contexts, and so on. Different filters can complement each other.

One particularly interesting option is to restrict non-discrimination filters to ultimate reasons: the invocation of group properties as important in their own right, rather than because of their association with further properties. This specification arguably allows us to capture a distinct category of moral

failure: to consider or be moved to treat some people worse just because they are different than others.

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Grover, Lisa (University of Exeter)

Do Individual Users of AI Tools Have Moral Responsibilities Toward Data Workers?

[**Keywords:** *AI; moral responsibility; virtue ethics; data workers*]

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) tools like ChatGPT has generated significant ethical concerns. This paper focuses on concerns regarding the working conditions and well-being of data workers involved in training these technologies. These content moderators and data annotators, frequently employed in low-paid roles in countries like Kenya, the Philippines, and India, are tasked with moderating and labelling vast amounts of content, including graphic and harmful material. This paper investigates whether individual users of ChatGPT bear moral responsibilities toward these workers.

Beginning with an exploration of the role of content moderators in AI development, the paper discusses the potential physical and psychological harms for these workers. The analysis begins by Drawing parallels with climate change ethics and applying the no-harm principle to assess the moral obligations of individual users. On this account, while mitigating harm to data workers primarily requires collective action, individual users also hold personal moral responsibilities that contribute to such collective efforts.

However, an objection is raised regarding the distance between end users and data workers, challenging the straightforward attribution of direct moral responsibility to end users. To address this, the paper explores alternatives grounded in the concept of moral visibility. Drawing on David Zoller's (2015) work, it highlights the harms caused by the invisibility and lack of recognition of data workers. This approach identifies a moral responsibility to avoid harm but in the case of AI tools, a stronger account is needed that grounds a responsibility to actively increase moral visibility and recognition of these workers. Building on Domini Lenzi's (2021) virtue ethical framework for climate change, the paper proposes a stronger account of moral responsibility. This account advocates for collective action to improve the visibility and recognition of data workers, grounded in an account of individual responsibility based on virtue.

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Haeg, Jonas (Stockholm University) **and Eskens, Romy** (Utrecht University)

Outrageous Advice

[**Keywords:** *advising; interpersonal address; evaluative stances; sexual assault; victim-blaming*]

It's often permissible, perhaps required, to advise people to take precautions against dangers. Think, for instance, of signs along dangerous hiking trails, doctors' health guidance, and transport companies' advice to keep belongings safe. Yet, some instances of advising, even when factually accurate, seem morally outrageous. A paradigmatic example is when police encourage women to reduce the risk of being raped or sexually assaulted by avoiding walking alone at night or limiting alcohol intake.

What makes this latter type of advice, but not the former, morally outrageous? While instrumental considerations (e.g., the advice might incentivise self-blame or help entrench oppressive norms) are relevant, our paper focuses on the sense that such advice is also non-instrumentally objectionable. But what exactly makes it so?

The first part of the paper anticipates and critiques several answers, such as that advice is outrageous when it shifts responsibility in objectionable ways or encourages people to suffer moral harm, like a reduced sense of equality. While each contains a grain of truth, we show that all answers are vulnerable to counterexamples.

The second part of the paper develops our answer: the Evaluative Duty View. Factually good advice is outrageous when it instantiates morally defective evaluative stances by the adviser. Advisers can fail to adequately evaluate key moral aspects of an advice situation, such as the advisee's capacity

for self-determination, the injustice of the danger, or the costs of taking precautions. These failures, which we call defective evaluative stances, can occur in individuals and groups, like states or police departments. Advice that instantiates such defects is wrongful and warrants outrage because, we argue, advisers have a duty to express sound evaluative stances when they make other people's actions and decisions their business, as they do when they try to influence their behaviour through advice.

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Hallich, Oliver (University of Duisburg-Essen)

Apologies - a critical view

[**Keywords:** *Forgiveness; Apologies; Reconciliation*]

Apologies, so we are often told, pave the way for forgiveness. This view is widely accepted in the literature, though not without qualifications. There is a broad consensus that apologies can be, and often are, poorly delivered, and that there is often reason to suspect that the apologizer merely performs "the apology ritual" to benefit from anticipated positive reactions to his apology. However, there is also a broad consensus that, in the absence of these shortcomings, apologies are an important tool for restoring relationships because, if sincere and genuine, they facilitate forgiveness.

In this contribution, I provide a more critical view of apologies. I defend two claims that first seem counterintuitive: first, I argue that apologies are morally problematic, and second, that they stand in the way of forgiveness rather than facilitating it. In Part 1, I argue that apologies are (also) directive speech acts. In Part 2, I specify this directive aspect of apologies and argue that they are requests for forgiveness. In Part 3, I show that there is a tension between the directive nature of apologies and the attitude of humility that a truly remorseful offender is expected to have. This tension generates reasons against apologizing and makes apologies morally problematic. Being humble, the offender will lack reasons for wanting to be forgiven, and he will not want to impose pressure upon the victim by asking for forgiveness. In Part 4, I argue that apologies undermine justified and unprompted forgiveness, thereby inhibiting genuine forgiveness. In Part 5, I illustrate how an offender may work towards unprompted forgiveness without apologizing and without imposing pressure upon the victim.

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Healey, Richard (London School of Economics and Political Science), and **Pepper, Angie** (University of Roehampton)

Reproducing Injustice: Abolition, Procreative Liberty, and Future Generations

[**Keywords:** *Animal Rights, Reproduction, Reproductive Rights, Abolitionism, Future Generations*]

All philosophers concerned with the plight of nonhuman animals recognize that significant reforms to our practices involving animals are morally required. The only real question is how we should reform these practices. One position, abolitionism, maintains that all human practices which exploit or use non-human animals must be abolished. This includes not only egregiously harmful practices such as factory farming and animal experimentation but also seemingly benign practices such as keeping animals as pets.

A common objection to abolitionism is that it requires huge amounts of unjust and coercive interference in the reproductive lives of domesticated animals. Roughly, the objection holds that to bring an end to practices the abolitionist deems objectionable "would not just require a cessation of human creation of animals, but a massively increased (and probably impossible) human effort to forcibly sterilize and/or confine all domesticated animals" (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, p. 80). Consequently, abolition is regarded as incoherent because, contrary to its expressed aims, it does not protect the rights of animals.

Our aim in this paper is to defend the abolitionist position against this objection from reproductive rights. We cede that sentient nonhuman animals have important interests in reproductive freedom. However, we defend two claims. First, interference with domesticated animals' reproductive freedom can be justified by appealing to the interests of existing and future animals against being unjustly

positioned within a socio-political hierarchy. This mirrors anti-abolitionists who accept that restrictions on animals' reproductive freedom are necessary, but claim they can be justified by appealing to the interests of the animals themselves. Second, we argue that domesticated animals' reproductive interests will not be adequately served in an ongoing interspecies community. Thus, we conclude that appealing to the reproductive interests of nonhuman animals is not the silver bullet against abolitionism that it is held to be.

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Holbeach, Naomi (University of Melbourne)

Good reasons for surgical innovation: can philosophical reasoning help to promote more responsible innovation?

[**Keywords:** *Surgical innovation; clinical reasoning; degrees of belief; confidence*]

Surgeons should only recommend or perform innovative surgery when they hold a rational belief that it will benefit the patient. This position is supported by surgeons' existing legal and professional obligations in several jurisdictions, including Australia (Medical Board of Australia, 2020). Forming a rational justification for belief is difficult even for the philosophically inclined surgeon, much less the ordinary surgeon undertaking their day-to-day tasks. Current approaches to clinical reasoning inadequately deal with the problem some clinicians face when deciding if they are justified in their belief in a treatment, especially an innovative treatment.

This paper proposes that philosophical reasoning provides the solution to the current gaps in clinical reasoning for surgical innovation. Firstly, philosophical reasoning can illustrate the structure of the argument used to justify the surgical innovation. This ensures that the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the argument are identified and addressed. Secondly, Foley's Lockean Thesis can be used to conceptualise a threshold of belief that surgeons can use to test whether they are justified in offering innovative surgery. There is both inherent value and instrumental value in this proposed solution. Better reasoning leads to better conclusions and therefore better decisions about surgical innovation, which hopefully promotes responsible innovation that is less likely to unacceptably harm patients. Better reasoning also builds confidence in surgeons and other stakeholders in healthcare so that surgical innovation is promoted and facilitated.

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Hopf, Leia (University of Bristol)

Should We Compensate Social Disadvantage Through Education?

[**Keywords:** *Distributive Justice, Education, Equality of Opportunity, Merit, Disability, Disadvantage, Demandingness, Priority*]

Several influential philosophers argue that the economically disadvantaged should be compensated for differences in educational achievement. I argue that they rely on a contentious distinction between the naturally and the socially disadvantaged. I propose a prioritarian alternative according to which more should be spent on the educationally worst-off, regardless of why they are worse off. This principle can alleviate harmful amounts of inequality in society, when necessary, without having to make questionable assumptions about natural and social causes for differences in people's educational achievement.

Equality of Opportunity advocates hold that education is valuable because it grants access to rewarding careers and powerful positions in society. The more educated you are the better your chances of success in competition for such positions. But because wealthy parents can invest more in their child's education a just society must ensure that people are compensated for the effect their economic background would have on their educational attainment and, thus, their chances of success in competition for jobs. A fair competition requires that those with the same amount of natural talent and ambition have the same chances of success.

However, these Equality of Opportunity principles distinguish between resource entitlements to the socially and the naturally disadvantaged. While social disadvantage should be fully compensated, natural disadvantage may be partially alleviated. I will first take their distinction as a given and show what problems we run into; then, I will draw on the social model of disability to question the distinction

between natural and social disadvantage altogether. I then propose an alternative priority principle, according to which more should be spent on the worst-off, regardless of why they are worse off. This principle is preferable to alternatives because it can alleviate harmful amounts of inequality in society without drawing an arbitrary distinction between natural and social disadvantage.

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Huseynli, Ilkin (Pavia University)

A Measure of Voluntariness in Migration

[**Keywords:** *Voluntariness; migration; measurement; Olsaretti*]

If the voluntariness of migrants has significant normative implications, the degree of voluntariness in migration ought also to affect, even if not entirely determining, the entitlements of migrants, and the obligations host countries have towards them.

According to one Serena Olsaretti, a person acts non-voluntarily when her action is motivated by her belief that all alternatives are unacceptable where the criterion of acceptability depends on objective criteria of well-being. Olsaretti treats voluntariness as a binary property and doesn't apply it to migration. In the migration literature, prominent advocates of this account of voluntariness, such as Ottonelli and Torresi, maintain a binary view. But perceiving voluntariness as binary is unsatisfactory as it prevents us from seeing relevant differences between migrants in terms of their degrees of voluntariness.

I argue that voluntariness in migration is a matter of degree. First, voluntariness is a property of actions. To say that a specific action of a person is voluntary is to say that she has an acceptable alternative to that specific action. When we assess whether a migrant lacks an acceptable alternative to a specific action, we make a probability judgment about the presence of her acceptable options. Second, migration is a process spanning over a long period time. Measuring a migrant's voluntariness equates to measuring her voluntariness over an extended period. To measure the overall degree of voluntariness of a complete process migration, we need to break down a person's migration into discrete spatial and temporal segments.

Voluntariness in migration is calculated through a summation process. Beginning with the first day of migration and continuing through to the final day, the methodology involves attaching probability scores for the degree of voluntariness of each day and calculating the ratio of voluntary days to total days for each individual day of the migration process.

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Izatt, Alyssa (University of British Columbia)

You'll Regret That! Paternalism & the Politics of Regret

[**Keywords:** *Regret, well-being, paternalism, autonomy*]

In general, we do not want to regret the choices we make. If I know that I am making a bad choice, but persist with the choice nonetheless, my regret is a justified consequence of my poor decision-making. Hesitance over making regret-worthy choices is evident in how we counsel friends about decisions. It's easy to imagine someone saying, "Don't do that, you'll regret it". We often invoke regret when we think about mistakes. Similarly, we might affirm ourselves by declaring that we have no regrets. Using regret in this way is intuitive. We seem to use it to refer to bad decision-making, what is not choice-worthy, and what we will think we will come to recognize as bad. However, this is not just a rhetorical turn of phrase. We care about regret. Statistics about regret can even be used to justify policy and clinical decision-making.

However, an emphasis on regret in decision-making can arguably be overblown. For instance, anti-abortion activists frequently point to women who regret their abortions to argue that abortion is bad for women. Similarly, regret over gender-affirming care has been used to justify adopting restrictive policies related to gender-affirming care. An elevated rate of regret among young women who opt for elective sterilization has been used to justify withholding the procedure from young or childfree women. In all these cases, those who experience regret are in the minority. Nonetheless, regret can be used to justify restrictive policies that impose on individual liberty. In this paper, I address this

politicization of regret. In particular, I consider how regret is often used selectively to undermine decision-making and to justify paternalism. I argue that while regret can sometimes be a helpful consideration in decision-making, we have good reason to be cautious about relying on prospective regret to justify our choices.

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Jarvis-Campbell, Joshua (University of Exeter)

Animal Experimentation, Extreme Poverty, and Necessity

[**Keywords:** *animal experimentation; animal ethics; extreme poverty; necessity; ethics of killing*]

Many animal rights theorists have argued that animals have a right to life, and that such a right entails the impermissibility of killing animals for experimental purposes. We cannot, according to such a view, kill an animal in order to gain knowledge on some potential drug, even if no pain is inflicted in the process, and even if such knowledge leads to significant benefits for humans. Many of the same animal rights theorists, however, tend to grant the permissibility of killing animals in other situations. For instance, they often argue that it is permissible for people in extreme poverty to kill animals if it is necessary for meeting their basic needs. I will defend two claims in this paper. The first is that many animal rights theorists who reject all killing of animals for experimental purposes but permit killing animals to meet basic needs have failed to adequately explain why one practice is always impermissible but not the other. The second is that we have good reason to think that an animal rights theorist cannot simultaneously hold that it is permissible to kill animals to meet basic needs, but always impermissible to kill animals for purposes of experimentation. In other words, I will argue that these animal rights theorists have not only failed to provide a good case for permitting killing to meet basic needs while rejecting all killing for experimental purposes, but that they are unable to provide such a case.

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Kolers, Avery (University of Louisville)

Toward a Code of Philosophical Research Ethics

[**Keywords:** *research ethics; respect for persons; integrity; consequentialism*]

The purpose of this presentation is to start a conversation about the need for, and potential content of, a code of ethics for philosophical research. I first argue that we do need such a code of ethics because major philosophical scandals of recent years are plausibly regarded as research ethics violations. To be sure, research ethics seems most important when it is on human subjects, so I consider whether and in what ways philosophical research counts as human subjects research, and whether this is a necessary condition of needing a code of ethics.

The place to look for codes of ethics, initially, is in extant research ethics and research integrity codes. I look at the US National Academy of Science code of research integrity and suggest that the “objectivity” standard in philosophy is unlike that in the sciences, because philosophical research is by nature adversarial like legal argumentation. But this socializes objectivity and increases the weight of additional standards such as stewardship and fairness.

I then look at the Belmont Report requirements of respect for persons, beneficence/nonmaleficence, and justice. The sharpest of these for Philosophy are respect for persons and justice; specifically, the justice criteria of public ownership of publicly funded research, nondiscrimination, and epistemic justice or inclusion in the research enterprise.

I conclude by applying these preliminary research ethics guidelines to the scandals with which we began.

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Kwan, Jonathan (NYU Abu Dhabi)

Confucian Eco-Democracy

[**Keywords:** *Confucianism; democracy; meritocracy; environmental virtue ethics; epistemic justifications for democracy*]

I argue that once the ecological dimensions of Confucianism are theorized in tandem with its political commitments, democracy will be better justified than meritocracy (rule by the virtuous) on Confucian grounds. I develop a Confucian eco-democratic view that conceptualizes the demos not as an aggregate of atomistic individuals living at one point in time but as an intergenerational community constituted by (1) relationships to members in the past and future, (2) relationships to a place and its environment, and (3) social norms, traditions, and rituals (li 禮) that motivate practices of ecological stewardship. This eco-cultural intergenerational conception of the demos grounds duties of ecological sustainability as constitutively a part of (rather than in tension with or limiting) the democratic project. I respond to the Confucian eco-meritocratic objection that the Confucian political community can be conceived of as intergenerational without seeing it specifically as the demos of a democracy. Virtuous rulers, on this view, may be better than democracy at protecting the environment and servicing the Confucian political community. I defend two arguments in favor of preferring eco-democracy over eco-meritocracy on Confucian grounds: an (ecological) virtue-based argument and an epistemological argument. Once virtue is seen not merely as a moral interpersonal matter that could be adequately cultivated in non-political contexts but as a matter of virtuously relating to the complex wide-ranging ecosystems, then cultivating such ecological virtue will inevitably require democratic participation in joint political activities of environmental concern. Second, the Confucian relational epistemological picture—which emphasizes (1) epistemic humility over anthropocentric hubris, (2) harmonizing many different perspectives, (3) robust collective epistemic norms, and (4) particularist skepticism of simply applying general rules from above—gives reason to favor democratic participation from all corners of society over top-down meritocratic rule when deciding how to structure collective relationships to the environment.

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Lin, Kida (University of Oxford)

When is Suboptimal Supererogation Wrong?

[**Keywords:** *Suboptimal Supererogation; Effective Altruism; Conditional Obligations*]

Suppose that I can do nothing, bear some supererogatory cost to save one child, or bear the same supererogatory cost to save two other children. Many philosophers have argued, or thought it obvious, that it would be wrong to save the one. I challenge that view. By examining when it becomes true that I have acted wrongly if I save the one, I conclude that no such demarcation points can be defended, and, on this basis, that saving the one is permissible.

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Malmqvist, Erik (University of Gothenburg), and **Szigeti, András** (Lund University)

Social Injustice and the Harm of Exploitation

[**Keywords:** *exploitation; injustice; relational equality; social hierarchy; vulnerability*]

It is widely recognized that exploitative transactions and relationships tend to occur against a background of unjust structural or institutional arrangements. For instance, the operation of sweatshops is enabled or facilitated by systemic poverty, inadequate labor protections, suppression of unions, and the marginalization of female and migrant workers. But how exactly is the micro-level wrong of exploitation related to the macro-level wrong of social injustice? In this paper, we side with structuralist exploitation theorists against their transactionalist opponents in arguing that there is a morally significant link between the two, beyond a mere causal or probabilistic one. At the same time, we argue that previous attempts to characterize this link have been unsuccessful. Unjust background conditions are relevant to the moral assessment of exploitative transactions, but not because they help determine which transactions count as exploitative or because they create special obligations of non-exploitation. Rather, on our view, exploitation that arises from social injustice is more harmful to the exploitee and therefore worse than exploitation that does not arise in this way. We draw on recent work on relational equality and social hierarchy to develop and defend this view. Our argument proceeds in two steps. First, we argue that all exploitative transactions and relationships involve relational harm—i.e., harm to the exploitee's interest in not being inferior to others—even when the exploitee benefits in other ways from being exploited. Second, we argue that this harm is greater in

cases involving social injustice. This is because, in these cases, the exploitee is treated as inferior not just by the exploiter but also by those who are responsible for the unjust background conditions. These agents make the exploitee asymmetrically vulnerable to the exploiter and lock them into a subordinate position vis-à-vis the latter, thereby exacerbating the relational harm they suffer.

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Miczke, Ida (University of Warsaw)

Towards a consequentialist ethics of attention and salience

[**Keywords:** *ethics; attention; salience; consequentialism*]

In recent years, moral philosophy has witnessed a burgeoning interest in the ethics of attention and salience. Originally introduced into the philosophical discourse by Iris Murdoch (Hepburn & Murdoch 1956, Murdoch 1970/2014), it is currently the subject of theoretical analyses from multiple perspectives (Archer 2022). At the same time, consequentialism has been usually assumed to be hardly compatible with serious ethical reflection on attention. Accused of limiting its scope only to evaluating actions and decisions to act (Hepburn & Murdoch 1956, Chappell 2022), consequentialism may seem to obviate the ethical importance of how we see and attend to the world around us.

The aim of this paper is to argue that this is not the case. Building on an independently plausible form of consequentialism that I propose to call “partially self-effacing consequentialism” (e.g. Pettit 2012, Railton 1984), I want to show that not only is there room for non-trivial ethics of attention in consequentialism, but that it is, in fact, an indispensable and crucial element of the consequentialist theory.

Bringing together partially self-effacing consequentialism and recent developments in the philosophy and psychology of attention and salience (e.g. Archer 2022, Lien et al. 2008), I want to propose what an accurate consequentialist ethics of attention and silence could look like. I will argue that critical emphasis should be given to our patterns of salience - the tendency to involuntarily spot certain features as standing out, compared to others (akin to Whiteley’s (2002) salience perspectives). For a partially self-effacing consequentialist it is no longer of primary importance what actions we choose; what is crucial is instead what we tend to perceive as salient and therefore meriting moral deliberation. This perception, however, can and should be trained (Schomstein & Johnson 2013) to accord with consequentialist evaluations, given its ethical - and political (Munton 2021) - importance.

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Moraro, Piero (Edith Cowan University)

Philosophers on Prison Abolitionism: Theory vs Practice

[**Keywords:** *prison abolition; punishment; retributivism; deterrence*]

Philosophers have long been debating the moral justifiability of punishment. However, they have seemingly ignored the adjacent question concerning the moral justifiability of incarceration, as demonstrated by the dearth of philosophical work on prison abolitionism. This silence is puzzling, given that, as I argue in this talk, many philosophers implicitly (or even explicitly) endorse the core assumptions of prison abolitionism. I consider some examples from the recent literature in philosophy of punishment, to show that many philosophers support prison abolitionism “in practice”, yet not “in theory”. That is to say: many philosophers endorse the practical strategies of the abolitionist agenda, yet refuse to engage with the underpinning normative assumptions about the (im)morality of incarceration. I then contend that this ambiguous stance is borne of a deliberate methodological choice, one that relegates issues concerning the reality of prisons to the margins of the philosophical

inquiry. The risk with this approach, I conclude, is that it hinders a fair assessment of prison abolitionism as a legitimate moral theory.

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Moriarty, Jeffrey (Bentley University)

When is Nepotism Permissible?

[**Keywords:** *discrimination; jobs; nepotism; property; opportunity*]

Sally owns a pizza shop. A job has become available in it. Is it permissible for Sally to hire her son Roger over a more qualified applicant? Nepotism is pervasive in the economy. Yet nepotism has a negative connotation, and many believe that jobs should go to the most qualified applicants. I will argue that nepotism is usually permissible in small privately held firms. This is because jobs are bundles of privately owned resources, and people should be allowed to do what they want with things they own, within broad limits. Moreover, people should be allowed to use their resources to benefit their family and friends, even if strangers have, in some sense, a stronger claim on those resources. Property rights are not absolute, however. We limit what people, including employers, can do with their property, in the light of countervailing moral considerations. So, I consider what can be said against nepotism, examining arguments from discrimination, equality of opportunity, welfare, and desert. I argue that, while some (not all) of these arguments provide good reasons to oppose nepotism, these reasons aren't decisive, at least in standard cases. I conclude by highlighting the limits of my argument. The case for a permission to engage in nepotism is strong in small privately held firms, because in this context ownership is robust and meaningful, but it is weaker in large publicly traded corporations, because in this context ownership is limited and less meaningful.

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Ó Laoghaire, Tadhg (Durham University)

The Other Resource Curse: Commodities, Market Volatility, and the Least-Developed Countries

[**Keywords:** *Resource justice; international justice; economic justice; volatility; development*]

Recently, several philosophers have attended to the injustices that stem from the 'international resource privilege', which allows rulers of a territory to sell that territory's natural resources on international markets, irrespective of those rulers' (un)accountability to domestic citizens. While such work is laudable, it doesn't exhaust the full extent of what has come to be known as 'the resource curse', the phenomenon where countries with considerable resource wealth nonetheless suffer from unimpressive – often downright tragic – development outcomes. Understood more holistically, the curse of natural resource wealth has not only to do with entrenching unaccountable elites, but pertains more basically to the volatility of commodities themselves as a source of wealth. The volatility of commodity markets undermines growth, exacerbates inequality, and hinders the ability of commodity-dependent states to carry out long-term planning of the sort required to escape the poverty traps to which least-developed countries (LDCs) are vulnerable. I will argue that the volatility of international commodity markets is an injustice suffered by the world's poorest countries. I will give several arguments for this claim. These arguments are grounded in 1) powerful states' contributions to LDCs' commodity-related suffering, 2) powerful states' benefitting from LDCs' specialisation in commodity exports, and 3) the importance of state capacity as a basis of the state-based order's legitimacy. After making the moral case, I highlight two implications of all this. First, major economies have a responsibility to help LDCs diversify their economies. Second, and more contentiously, major economies have obligations to reduce the volatility of global commodity markets. Drawing on Keynes' postwar work on the importance of taming commodity volatility, I suggest one way in which commodity prices could be stabilised, relying on the maintenance of internationally managed buffer stocks of a basket of commodities. I'll conclude by discussing market-based and feasibility objections to such a proposal.

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Olsaretti, Serena (ICREA & Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Egalitarianism for Egoists Alone? Carers' Disadvantage and the Self-Interest Bias

[**Keywords:** *Care and Justice; Gender Justice; Equality; Self-Interest*]

Elizabeth Anderson has called luck egalitarianism “egalitarianism for egoists alone”, as it deems the choice to care for dependents to be an expensive taste and holds that “[p]eople who want to avoid the vulnerabilities that attend dependent caretaking must therefore decide to care only for themselves” (Anderson 1999: 300). Others, too, have voiced the worry that at least some or even all theories of justice favour those with self-interested preferences and fail to do justice to carers (e.g. O’Neill 1986; Held 1990; Jagger 1988: 30-34). This worry has motivated some to abandon luck egalitarianism and distributive equality, or even theories of justice altogether, and to turn to theories of care as an alternative.

In this paper I subject to close scrutiny the idea that theories of justice display a bias in favour of those with (narrowly) self-interested preferences - that is, those who have preferences about oneself – to the detriment of those with (beneficial) other-regarding preferences – that is, preferences which have, as part of their non-instrumental goal, that of benefiting certain others. I argue, first, that most theories of justice, as they are currently formulated, do display a bias in favour of narrowly self-interested ambitions and against other-regarding ones, and I identify three different commitments that lead them to display this bias. Second, I argue that the bias is unmotivated and unfair: unmotivated because the commitments that lead to it are not integral to the theories, and unfair because it precludes us from capturing a form of exploitation of those with other-regarding preferences. Finally, I draw some lessons from this critical discussion for how to formulate the demands of justice so as to avoid the bias in favour of self-interest and capture the disadvantage of those who choose to care for others.

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Pietrini-Sanchez, Maria-Jose (Universidad Panamericana, Mexico City)

Functional parenthood: a fiduciary relationship, not a psychological one

[**Keywords:** *Philosophy of parenthood; Familial relationship goods; moral parental rights; surrogacy; LGBTQ+ families*]

The burgeoning literature on family law suggests that legal parental rights should extend to functional parents, that is, adults who lack biological or adoptive ties to a particular child but who have nonetheless developed a parent-child relationship and acted as parents to that child. This article examines the question of what the moral grounds of functional parenthood are. I argue that models based on psycho-emotional bonds are not adequate to ground the moral rights of functional parents. I argue that a better model is the Fiduciary View according to which functional parents are those adults who engage in a fiduciary parental role in which the goods that the parent-child relationship distinctively facilitates are produced. I argue that there are good pro tanto reasons for gestational procreators to qualify as functional parents, regardless of their parental intentions or biological ties. The Fiduciary View has great explanatory power; it can explain cases involving LGBTQ+ families, various types of surrogacies, babies swapped at birth, embryo mix-up, and gestation through artificial wombs.

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Prosser, Katie (University of Leeds)

On Species Revival and the Badness of Extinction

[**Keywords:** *Extinction; revival; de-extinction; applied ethics*]

Extinction is commonplace and is, for the most part, a natural part of the existence of life on Earth. We nevertheless think that it is bad when species go extinct; to varying degrees, and in various cases, we bemoan the extinction of species. This can be explained by, the loss of the species itself, or the loss of the instrumental value of the species, or the loss of the intrinsic value of the species, or some combination of these. These are what we might think of as the bad-making features of extinction.

Recent developments in synthetic biology mean that scientists could, in the near future, create organisms of an extinct species. In a sense, then, it is possible to revive extinct species, or to have members of an extinct species in existence again. This is what I call “species revival,” also commonly known as “de-extinction.”

The proponent of species revival argues that, where species go extinct, reviving the species can mitigate some or all of the bad-making features noted above. Species revival, then, can serve as some extension of conservation. The opponent of species revival denies this claim, arguing that reviving a species is not as good as conserving the species and preventing the extinction.

In this paper, I consider one way to make sense of the opponent’s position. Namely, I consider whether there is something bad about extinction over and above the aforementioned bad-making features. I argue that, in the case of anthropogenic extinctions, this may be explained by some moral reason not to cause species to go extinct. If this is correct, then the opponent of species revival seems to be right, for even if we can mitigate the bad-making features of extinction, some morally bad state of affairs occurs when a species goes extinct.

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Rinner, Stefan (University of Duisburg-Essen), **Kulakova, Eugenia** (University of Duisburg-Essen), **Dänzer, Lars** (University of Duisburg-Essen)

The Therapeutic Game

[Keywords: *Talking therapy, Conversational scorekeeping, Accommodation*]

In “Scorekeeping in a Language Game”¹, David Lewis famously compares conversations to playing baseball. Just like baseball, conversations have a score which, together with rules for correct play, determines which utterances are acceptable or even true in the course of a conversation. For all similarities, however, there is a crucial difference between conversations and baseball games. Unlike the score of a baseball game, conversational score adjusts in such a way that the utterances made in the course of a conversation count as correct play. This is also known as accommodation. Starting from this scorekeeping approach to language use, the overall aim of the present talk is to provide a better understanding of the effectiveness and the linguistic working of various methods and interventions of talking therapies. According to the scorekeeping model, these methods and interventions will be effective by changing the score of the therapeutic conversation, in particular in the form of accommodation. This will have significant implications for the therapeutic practice, as it will highlight the importance of training therapists in the linguistic aspects of therapeutic methods, in particular in the use of accommodation. The methods that will be discussed include, among other things, the asking of systemic questions in systemic therapy, the use of transference and countertransference in psychodynamic approaches, techniques of empathic listening, such as paraphrasing, and motivational interviewing in person-centered therapy, and the application of the Socratic questioning in cognitive behavioral therapy.

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Ritterfeld, Leah (University of Vienna)

Ressentiment, Resentment, and Embitterment Disorder: Reframing Emotional Responses to Perceived Injustice

[Keywords: *ressentiment, resentment, post-traumatic embitterment disorder*]

The concepts of resentment and Ressentiment have recently been employed to explain phenomena such as right-wing populism, Trumpism, the incel movement, and identity politics. Yet, their definitions and implications remain contested, particularly the distinction between these two emotional responses. Resentment is often framed as a morally justified reaction to violated expectations, signaling accountability. In contrast, Ressentiment, as Nietzsche and Scheler describe, is a corrosive psychological state characterized by bitterness, rumination, and self-victimization. While Ressentiment is often used to dismiss certain political positions as pathological, an analysis of both terms reveals significant overlap, as both reflect responses to perceived injustices.

This paper introduces a novel dimension to this debate by connecting resentment and Ressentiment with Post-Traumatic Embitterment Disorder (PTED), a psychological condition proposed by Michael Linden. PTED describes persistent bitterness and obsessive rumination arising from an inability to cope with perceived injustices. These traits mirror the characteristic features of Ressentiment, illustrating how individual emotions can evolve into collective grievances, fueling populism and extremist movements.

Through three case studies – the incel community, Hochschild’s analysis of Trump voters’ ‘deep stories’, and Linden’s paradigmatic PTED case – this paper highlights the interplay between antagonistic emotions of bitterness and hostility, and moral discontent.

Ultimately, I argue that the emotional states of Ressentiment and PTED, while detrimental to well-being, should not be dismissed as mere pathology. Instead, they function as forms of moral protest with the potential for moral reflection and growth. By reframing these emotional states as a form of moral protest, this analysis challenges the tendency to use the concept of Ressentiment to pathologize and dismiss, advocating for a more nuanced engagement with grievance-driven movements and political polarization.

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Sharma, Ritu (University of British Columbia)

Epistemic Harms of Marital Rape

[Keywords: *Marital Rape, Rape Myths, Hermeneutical Injustice, Moral Blinding, Experimental Injustice*]

Across jurisdictions, rape within marriage continues to be treated as either a less severe crime than other forms of rape or as no crime at all. This is true even though the physical and psychological harms of marital rape on the victim are well-documented. Aspects of marital rape that are not yet well-studied include 1) its epistemic harms (for both the victim and other family members, such as children), and 2) the ways in which a marriage – as the legal, social, familial, and interpersonal context in which the rape occurs – radically informs both the victim’s experience of the rape and the specific wrongs she endures.

This paper focuses on the first of these two themes: the epistemic harms and injustices of marital rape. Some feminist scholars focus on how the widespread acceptance of rape myths – such as the myth that rape cannot occur within marriage – can lead to hermeneutical injustice. I argue that this does not exhaust the range of epistemic harms that attend marital rape. I argue that victims of marital rape endure what I shall call experiential injustice in cases where they internalise their oppression in ways that cause them not to recognise the nature and normativity of their experience. I also offers a modification to existing accounts of rape myths which rely entirely on traditional gender identities, so that non-heterosexual marriages can also be accommodated in the analysis.

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Summerfield, Samuel (University of Leeds)

Cognisance: An Anti-Luckist Account of Agent-Regret

[Keywords: *Moral Luck; Regret; Blame; Apology, Harm*]

The phenomenon of agent-regret –a distinct feeling and disposition to offer restitution resulting from one’s causal responsibility in a regrettable state of affairs –was first discussed by Williams (1976). For many, an agent’s failure to experience and display agent-regret in relevant circumstances will reflect poorly on them. The lorry driver who hits a child ought to feel differently about the situation than a bystander does, even if they are not at fault for having hit the child.

This observation appears to be problematic to those within the moral luck debate who subscribe to the Parity Principle –that agents can be morally assessed differently if, and only if, their actions differ due to voluntary control. If it is true that the lorry driver is no more blameworthy than a less misfortunate driver, why is the unlucky driver morally required to feel a special kind of regret about the child’s death?

Given that the Anti-Luckist must explain, or explain away, the phenomenon of agent-regret, I present an account based upon the concept of cognisance. This account is two-fold. Firstly, one is morally required to refrain from uttering true statements where that utterance would cause unnecessary harm. This unnecessary harm constraint allows for harmful truth telling only when this harm is, in some way, legitimately justified. Secondly, one ought to offer apologetic utterances –though not necessarily apologies –in cases where one has caused harm, even if one is not blameworthy for this harm.

The cognisance account aims to explain the observation of agent-regret whilst avoiding committing the anti-luckist to unintuitive or unwieldy moral positions.

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Swarup, Shruta (University of Toronto)

Fairness, Free-Riders, and Political Obligation

[**Keywords:** *fairness; free-riding; political authority; political obligation*]

Considerations of fairness are usually applied to distributional questions. In such contexts, fairness is a matter of honouring entitlements. But considerations of fairness also arise in contexts where we think it important to honour the value of other peoples' efforts. We think people should "do their fair share" in many ways. One of my aims in this paper is to contribute to the debate about when and to what extent fairness requires us to bear burdens for the sake of providing benefits (e.g., in the context of cooperative schemes). When and why do we have such duties? The first part of this paper is devoted to answering these questions. Doing so is important in its own right, but the answers have significant implications in political contexts. So-called "fair play" theorists argue that we can ground political authority in considerations of fairness. According to them, the moral principle that forbids free-riding can generate "political obligations" on the part of citizens (i.e., *prima facie* moral obligations to obey the law *qua* law). In part by clarifying when and why people have fairness-based obligations to contribute to beneficial schemes, I demonstrate that fair play theorists are wrong. Contrary to many fair play theorists, I argue that not only is consciousness of cooperation necessary to generate fairness-based obligations, those who cooperate in ways that create benefits for others must intend to produce those benefits in order for fairness based obligations to reciprocate to arise. I then argue that, even if citizens intend to produce the benefits conferred by their obedience to laws, this is not sufficient to ground the political authority of the state. If citizens have a *prima facie* duty to obey the law, this fact has nothing to do with fairness.

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Thomson, Jordan Arthur (University of Toronto)

Should Snitches get Stitches?

[**Keywords:** *snitching; fidelity; betrayal; reliance*]

The tattletale is a nuisance; he makes demands of our time and energy in service of his petty desires to punish or thwart. The whistleblower is anything but a nuisance; she endeavors to bring our attention to (and protect us from) significant wrongdoing, often at significant risk to herself. The tattletale deserves to be dismissed and rebuked; the whistleblower merits esteem and gratitude. I take these facts about tattletales and whistleblowers to be self-evident, which is why they are not the central focus of this paper. I am interested in a similar but more elusive creature: the snitch. More closely related to the tattletale than the whistleblower, the snitch's behavior often raises tricky moral questions, particularly in cases where the behavior he reports is wrongful. But the whistleblower also reports wrongful behavior, yet there is no question about how we ought to respond to her. So, what distinguishes the whistleblower from the snitch such that we unreservedly applaud the former but abhor the latter? We all know that snitches get stitches, but should they? I argue that they should. Well, sometimes. Probably.

Because we cannot tackle the ethics of snitching until we know what we're dealing with, I begin by developing an account of snitching. This happens in two stages. First, I locate the snitch within an intuitive taxonomy of various types of reporters, specifically those who report the norm-violating behavior of others. This taxonomy is informed by reflection on cases and linguistic practice. In the

second stage, I dig deeper, developing an account of the snitch's distinctive features. I argue that to snitch is to violate a pro tanto duty of fidelity to refrain from policing others by way of reporting their behavior. With this account in hand, I conclude by examining the ethics of snitching.

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Versari, Davide (University of Eastern Piedmont)

Is There Anything Like Political Experts?

[**Keywords:** *Political Experts; Expertise; Epistemic Democracy; Political Epistemology*]

The discussion on experts and expertise has recently acquired major importance in the philosophical literature. Social epistemologists have been pushed to dedicate their attention to this topic, focusing on issues like who the experts are, how they are to be identified, what their social role is, etc.

The debate on the role of experts in politics is of particular interest, as it has brought up many issues in relation to the value and nature of democracy. But scholars in this field have generally focused on scientific experts and on the role they might play in the political arena, whereas political decision-making involves other kinds of considerations as well, like moral and prudential ones. Thus, it seems imprecise to consider scientific expertise as the only form of epistemic authority required in the political field.

However, it seems equally wrong to reduce political expertise to the moral or prudential dimension. First, because it is controversial whether “moral experts” exist in the first place. Second, because this characterisation would be as partial as the one in terms of purely scientific expertise.

Problems are faced even when trying to identify some examples of political experts in everyday practice. Those profiles that can be regarded as the closest approximation to political experts either lack some desirable features of a hypothetical political expert, or they cannot be associated by systematic and recurrent elements, such that they can be considered representative of a more general class of “political experts”.

Therefore, my aim is to provide a more systematic analysis of the intuition about the existence of political experts through the lenses of social epistemology. Eventually, I will argue that a rigorous definition of “political expert” cannot be given and that this has important consequences on the possibility to argue for an epistemic defense of democracy.

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Williams, Garrath (Lancaster University)

Kantian free markets

[**Keywords:** *markets; freedom; public goods; equity; instrumentalisation*]

On a neoliberal view, free markets require a minimum of government regulation. This paper proposes an alternative, Kantian framing. We should understand free markets as public goods that uphold people's freedom. More specifically, they enable people to act as means, but not mere means, for one another.

We often assume that markets arise from people exercising private rights to property and contract. In fact, this permits only a few private trades: e.g. swapping apples for pears over a garden fence. Markets proper require public fora where buyers and sellers encounter one another as well as a public medium of exchange (i.e. money). Modern markets also rely on complex legal structures such as business corporations and intellectual property. Even more than the market squares of Kant's day, they require detailed rules and oversight to function as genuine public goods, and to avoid damage to other public goods (such as clean air or the information needed for public reasoning).

Free markets must also respect individual freedom. In Kantian terms, they should enable people to act as means for one another without becoming <i>mere&/i> means. If market structures operate inequitably or opaquely, then I suggest that people cannot participate freely and are used as mere means. In such cases, legal frameworks need to be made more equitable and transparent – for

example, to ensure that employees are represented and informed within businesses, rather than acting as means to they-know-not-what.

In sum: if markets are to be public goods that are consistent with freedom for all, there must be public mechanisms to ensure that they operate equitably and transparently, so that people can participate without becoming mere means.

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Panel Sessions

Panel 1

Domination Theory: Conceptual Foundations for New Directions

In recent years, political philosophy has witnessed the application of the concept of domination to a series of important debates, from the justice of the family to core issues in economic justice such as universal basic income, exploitation and workplace democracy, to understanding the underlying commitments of political ideologies, such as socialism, liberalism and feminism. Moreover, domination has been key to recent contributions to debates about various core concepts in political philosophy, such as vulnerability, rights, justice, and equality. However, alongside these advances in applying domination theory, persistent questions remain regarding the concept's basic structure. Just what is it for a person to be dominated, and just what sorts of entities can dominate? Just what sort of value is nondomination, and how does it differ from and fit with other values and normative commitments? With a view to helping contribute to greater advances in recent applied debates, this panel proposes to return to the foundations of domination theory to discuss various basic conceptual questions regarding the nature of domination and its value. What does it take to protect people from domination? For example, are there important differences between preventing potential dominators from interfering with the potentially dominated and merely disincentivising such interference through the use of post-hoc sanctions? Would withdrawing from interaction with other people altogether protect us from domination? If so, what does that tell us about how the concept of domination connects to other important values, such as community and sociality? Relatedly, how can we square a commitment to nondomination's value with an appreciation of the value of caring relationships that are in part constituted by high degrees of dependency? The panel will bring together three early career researchers (who have each contributed to recent debates on these topics) to explore these issues together.

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Bryan, Alexander (Cambridge University)

Realising non-domination

Domination involves an agent B being subject to another agent A's uncontrolled capacity to interfere. One task of republican theories of freedom is to develop an account of the conditions in which some agent A can be said to have no such capacity. The standard account claims that the attachment of sanctions to some option o can take it 'off the menu' or make it 'inaccessible' for A, creating a situation equivalent to A not having the capacity to o at all. This capacity will then be 'ignorable'. My aim in this paper is to defend and develop this position by considering whether republicans should be indifferent between institutional mechanisms which bring about non-domination by making options ignorable and those which, through ex ante preventative measures, take the option of o-ing away from A entirely. This question emerges from the line of criticism developed by Matthew Kramer, who argues that A remains free to o even when very costly sanctions are attached, and that only pre-emptive preventative measures can make it that A cannot o. The standard account seems to provide a counter-intuitive answer – that we have no reason to prefer the latter to the former so long as the package of post-hoc sanctions is sufficient to render that capacity ignorable. Yet A may still o. To motivate the republican position, I provide an account of how post-hoc sanctions render options inaccessible. I consider cases in which agents seek to choose an option even though it might be thought inaccessible and argue that in such cases the threshold at which a capacity becomes ignorable will increase. Additionally, I suggest that preventative approaches are liable to undermine the character of non-domination by virtue of their tendency to produce attitudes which sit uneasily with some of the primary benefits of non-domination.

Porro, Costanza (Lancaster University)

Domination, care and relational equality

Relationships of care are amongst the most valuable and important human relationships. They are necessary for people to survive and thrive throughout their lives; through relationships of care, people have a range of core needs met and develop and maintain key capacities. At the same time, however, relationships of care are also the settings of significant inequalities of power which can amount to domination. Amongst the most significant of those inequalities are those between care receivers and caregivers, especially in the context of dependency care relationships, such as the relationship between parents and young children, in which the care receiver is dependent on the caregiver for the satisfaction of a number of basic survival needs. In these cases, significant differences in capacities, including in the possession of autonomous agency, exacerbate power asymmetries, as well as generating questions about whether equality and non-domination should be regarded as a the ideal to be pursued in the context of such relationships.

The main aim of this paper is to address the apparent tensions between care, on the one hand, and a commitment to relational equality and non-domination, on the other. First, contrary to what articulated by some theorists of moral and relational equality, I claim that these relationships of care should be regarded as relationships among equals. Second, I engage with the recent neo-republican literature on care and domination and argue for the adoption of a relational egalitarian perspective according to which domination is not objectionable per se but is rather only objectionable when it amounts to a relationship of inferiority or subordination. This, I claim, is key to reconcile the tension between care, equality and non-domination.

MacRae, Callum (Jagiellonian University)

Is nondomination a social ideal?

According to a prominent strain of thought in the republican tradition, nondomination is a social ideal. That is, it's something that can be enjoyed only by living in the right sort of political community with others, rather than something that can be enjoyed asocially, by simply withdrawing from others altogether. This understanding has important implications for how nondomination relates to other important political ideals, such as community and independence. In this paper I argue that it is not so clear that nondomination is a social value in this way, and consequently, that it is not so clear that it is related to ideals like community and independence in the ways republicans have claimed.

First, I distinguish three subtly different ideals of nondomination: one grounded on freedom as avoiding arbitrary dependence, one grounded on a negative relational egalitarian commitment to avoiding relations of inequality, and one grounded on a positive relational egalitarian commitment to achieving relations of equality. Then I argue that only on the latter of these interpretations is nondomination well understood as a social ideal. The central argument is that only on this positive relational egalitarian account can we adequately explain why nondomination is a social ideal. Both arbitrary dependence and avoiding relations of inequality can be achieved in the absence of community with others. Only if nondomination consists in achieving a kind of egalitarian relationship with others is there a coherent rationale for thinking that it can't be achieved asocially. I conclude with some thoughts about the implications of this argument for republicanism and domination theory more broadly. In particular, I argue that republicans can only make good on some of their claims about nondomination's relationship with community and independence by abandoning some of their other claims about the nature of nondomination.

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Panel 2

Rethinking the Nature of Nudging

Nudges are an important new tool in the policy-maker's toolkit. Nudge interventions are various, but include, for example:

- In a cafeteria, placing healthy options in more prominent locations, with the aim of getting more people to choose the healthier option,
- Setting registration on the organ donor list as the default, while leaving the option to opt-out, with the aim of having more registered organ donors,
- Framing a medical treatment in terms of survival rates, rather than fatality rates, with the aim of getting more patients to accept the treatment

There is no precise, agreed-upon, definition of a 'nudge', yet there are some features that they are generally taken to have. They are interventions informed by research in social psychology and behavioral economics, and are thought to have a general, and predictable, effect on behavior. They are mild or subtle, and generally easy to resist. They don't involve making a change to economic incentives, nor do they involve the elimination of options.

These features might suggest that nudges are relatively easy to justify. However, a number of worries have been raised about their permissibility. For some, nudges fail to respect our rationality, since they are seen as ways of influencing individuals by triggering aspects of our psychology that are not rational. Others have objected that nudges are not transparent, since nudgees often lack awareness of the fact that they are being nudged, and that they are manipulative.

The papers in this panel will consider some of the central questions concerning the nature and the morality of nudging. The aim is not only to investigate aspects of this notion that have received insufficient attention so far, but also to revise some of the assumptions that are too often taken for granted in the philosophical debate.

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De Marco, Gabriel (University of Oxford) and **Douglas, Thomas** (University of Oxford)
On the Putative Inverse Relationship between Nudge Efficacy and Nudge Resistibility

It is often thought that the permissibility of a nudge can depend on whether, or to what degree, it is resistible. In assessing the extent to which a nudge is resistible, authors sometimes appeal to the efficacy of the nudge, suggesting that there is an inverse relationship between the efficacy of a nudge, on the one hand, and how easy it is to resist, on the other. Some endorse something like: Inverse Relationship (IR): the more efficacious the nudge, the harder it is to resist (and vice versa). Other times, IR is not explicitly invoked, but authors make inferences which suggest that they accept it, or something close to it.

We think that IR is not quite right, and in this paper, we show why by developing a more nuanced understanding of the connection between a nudge's efficacy and how easy it is to resist. In doing so, we clarify when the inference from degree of efficacy to degree of resistibility can be justified, and when it cannot. Much of our argument against IR, and towards a more developed account of the relationship between a nudge's efficacy and its degree of resistibility, is done by way of disambiguating these two notions.

Our argument has several upshots. First, IR is not a conceptual truth, on any plausible understanding of the relevant terms. Second, though low efficacy might suggest easy resistibility, high efficacy might not be indicative of the nudge's being difficult to resist. Third, contrary to what some have suggested, the need to ensure that nudges are easy to resist may not put an upper limit on how efficacious they can be. Finally, defenders of IR may be on even weaker ground with respect to targeted interventions.

Renzo, Massimo (King's College London)

Nudging, Autonomy and Rationality

It's hard to shake the feeling that central cases of nudges, such as those involving setting defaults, are morally problematic. (Think of the famous cafeteria example.) These cases seem morally problematic even when it's clear that they are justified all things considered. And yet identifying the reason why these forms of nudges are morally problematic has proven difficult. Some have tried to do so by appealing the idea that nudges disrespect our autonomy; others by appealing instead to the idea that there is a sense in which nudges undermine our rationality. Ultimately, however, none of the accounts available seem persuasive. Recently, David Enoch has offered a novel autonomy-based view. Nudges offend against the ideal of autonomy, according to Enoch, because they sever the connection between two values which are constitutive of this ideal: the value of non-alienation and the value of sovereignty. Enoch's account deserves close attention not only because, on the face of it, it seems to elegantly explain why central cases of nudges are morally problematic, but also because it does so by appealing to a genuinely new way to think about the value of acting autonomously. I will argue that ultimately Enoch's account ought to be rejected. Instead, I offer an alternative approach that enables us to deal with some of the important issues identified by Enoch without facing the problems faced by his account. The distinctive feature of my own account is that it connects more closely the value of autonomy and the value of rationality. On my view, we don't need to choose between the claim that nudging disrespect autonomy and the claim that it undermines our rationality. Nudging does both things because autonomy and rationality are connected in an important way – one that philosophers working on these notions have failed to grapple with.

Waller, Robyn Repko (University of Sussex)

When is my choice my own?: The impact of algorithmic nudging on user (free) agency

Online engagement is replete with algorithmic nudges. Take, for instance, the design of user interfaces for recommender systems on social media or pings from one's smart watch. The ethics of the implementation of these algorithmically personalized nudges has been widely discussed, with a central focus on libertarian paternalism. Nudging may be permissible if, for instance, the user acting on her freedom of choice ends up better off, as they themselves would judge, in acting in line with the nudge.

Here, I want to focus on the user qua (free) agent in context of algorithmic nudging. I will argue with some kinds of algorithmic nudging, there is an anemic sense in which the user qua agent is free and so morally responsible because of the impact of such nudges to formation of the user's character. To do so, I will bring in resources from adaptive preference formation as well as the free will debate on sourcehood, manipulation, and epistemic conditions. Free will, as contemporarily theorized, involves an exercise of control, or influence, over oneself "over one's actions, decisions, motivational or broader constitutive character and psychological states. Freedom of choice, or leeway, is one kind of relevant freedom, but, importantly, many theorists take being the source of one's, say, character and actions, or sourcehood, is to be crucial to being a free agent. Sourcehood, I'll argue, requires both freedom of choice along with the kind of epistemic access and reflection on potential character-forming influences that users in (some) algorithmic nudging contexts lack. Ending up better off as the user themselves would first-order prefer is too anemic for free sourcehood agency. If this is correct, we open the door to concerns that users are not (as) morally responsible for a wide swatch of their sometimes morally weighty nudge-influenced character and actions.

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Panel 3

The Ethics of Academia

The panel explores ethical challenges in academia, focusing on two central themes: special relationships that academics find themselves in and exploitative structures within academia. Firstly, academics find themselves in special relationships with students, colleagues, and the public. They have a duty of care for their students, which, in many universities now extends to forms of emotional labour and counselling. Relationships with fellow academics, particularly through peer review and research collaboration, raise questions about what kind of principles and norms ought to foster transparency, trust and accountability. Finally, academic research is meant to shape public debate. This raises the question of the responsibilities of academics towards the public and limits of academic freedom.

Secondly, academic contracts are often insecure, and short-term, conditions and pay have been eroded, and academics are expected to engage in overtime and unpaid service work, such as peer review. Reliance on unpaid contributions from academics yields significant profits for private corporations. This raises the question of whether the current publishing model can and should be replaced.

The panel aims to elicit engagement of these interconnected issues through a set of four talks. In 'The Ethical Limits of Risky Philosophical Inquiry', the authors defend a permissive institutional model for academic freedom. In 'Right to Explanation and Academic Peer Review', the author proposes that a right to meaningful explanation can address the challenges of opacity and contestability of publication decisions. In 'Academic Publishing and Structural Injustice', the author critiques the dominant publishing system as structurally unjust, exploring alternatives that focusses on the accountability of academics. The paper 'Do Striking Academics Treat Students as Mere Means?' shifts attention onto concerns about collective action in academia, focussing on the potential instrumentalization of students in the recent Marking and Assessment Boycott.

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Tuvel, Rebecca (Rhodes College) and **Sampson, Eric** (Purdue University)
The Ethical Limits of Risky Philosophical Inquiry

Recently, some philosophers have argued for censoring academics who express views deemed harmful or dangerous. Examples include calls to censor views on gender identity (Byrne, Stock, Lawford-Smith), voluntary eugenics (Singer, Savulescu, Anomaly), the possibility of transracism (Tuvel), and consensual adult-child sex (Kershnar). In this paper, we defend a general theory about the ethical limits of philosophical inquiry that takes seriously concerns about harm and danger but ultimately supports a permissive approach. We call our view the 'institutional model.'

On our view, academic philosophy is an institution complete with roles and role-players designed to achieve the institution's legitimate goal. Academic philosophy's legitimate goal is philosophical understanding and its role-players (philosophers) advance that goal by presenting the best arguments, theories, and objections as they see them—even if those views are de re morally heinous. We draw parallels with other institutions, such as law, airport security, entertainment, and markets, where role-players are morally permitted to act in ways that they would not necessarily be permitted to act outside the institutional context.

Along the way, we consider three major objections: that our view licenses the expression of nearly any idea; that it risks undermining academic philosophy's goals by privileging arguments on the institutionally powerful side of moral debates; and that the harms faced by marginalized groups are too great or too immediate to allow open inquiry into certain topics.

Maheshwari, Kritika (TU Delft)

The Right to Explanation and Academic peer Review

Imagine that you, an early-career philosopher, submitted a manuscript to a prestigious journal. Many months later, you receive a rejection with the following comment: 'Does not meet the journal's standards.' Frustrated and left to speculate whether the decision stemmed from conceptual flaws, misalignment with the journal's focus, implicit biases, or the possibility that your topic wasn't mainstream or 'cool' enough, you begin questioning the fairness and transparency of the peer review process. This situation isn't merely imaginary; many of us have been there and experienced it firsthand.

This scenario parallels recent debates surrounding the 'right to explanation' in artificial intelligence (AI) decision-making, which aims to promote transparency, accountability, and fairness in automated decisions impacting individuals. In the case of AI, proponents argue that explanations enhance trust and help detect biases, while critics caution against the feasibility of explaining complex models and the risk of oversimplification. These debates find striking relevance in the case of academic peer review systems, where decisions are sometimes high-stake in nature: getting a paper accepted (or rejected) could influence one's job prospects, contribute to gatekeeping of knowledge, etc. And yet, the connections between the two debates haven't been closely explored.

Incorporating a right to explanation in academic peer review could be advantageous for a number of reasons. It would help make explicit the rationale behind decisions in individual cases, promote trust in the peer review system, expose biases, and empower academics in positions of vulnerability to self-advocate for their work. This raises the question: is there a right to a meaningful explanation of the review process? To this end, this paper discusses recent proposals for both the grounds and content of a right to explanation for automated decision-making and explore how existing proposals fare when applied, with suitable modifications, in the context of academic peer review.

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Slater, Joe (University of Glasgow)

Academic Publishing and Structural Injustice

Academics regularly complain about features of the dominant publishing paradigm. In this paper, I focus on academic journals. Over half of the papers in all academic journals are in a venue owned by one of just five publishing houses (Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Taylor and Francis, Springer and Sage). In recent decades, these have increased their market share, and their profit margins. These companies are extremely wealthy. Yet, while they rake in profits, the bulk of labour seems to come from academics who are unpaid for the articles they produce and who volunteer to conduct quality control (the review process).

Drawing upon the work on Iris Marion Young, I argue that this system is structurally unjust. Once I outline the features that make the system structurally unjust, I consider alternative publishing paradigms that do not possess the pernicious features of the current system, specifically arguing that these problems are contingent, and can be mitigated or alleviated.

Recently, Zheng (2018) has argued that the agents are responsible for structural injustice in virtue of the social roles we occupy (the 'Role-Ideal Model of Accountability'). I describe this view, and argue that in the role of academics, individuals are responsible for resisting the injustice in the system. Finally, I examine a variety of ways that academics can resist the system, keeping in mind Young's suggestion that what we expect of agents should be 'practically manageable'. I argue that while almost all academics have some duties in this regard, the bulk of the responsibility falls upon more senior academics, because they have more power, and lower opportunity costs associated with resistance.

Sticker, Martin (University of Bristol)

Do striking academics treat their students as mere means?

Striking workers often inflict harm or inconveniences on what I call 'innocent and powerless third parties' (IPTPs) in order to put pressure on another party, their employer. IPTPs are not responsible for creating or maintaining the conditions that workers strike against (innocence), and they do not have the power to concede to the workers' demands in order to end the strike action (powerlessness). It seems that they are treated as pawns, or, in Kantian terms, as a mere means. This is a more serious ethical challenge to strikes than many others proposed in the literature. Yet, I argue that IPTPs are not necessarily, and also not usually, treated as mere means by striking workers.

My discussion focuses on the UK's recent Marking and Assessment Boycott (MAB). When deliberating with colleagues about whether or not to participate in the MAB the strongest ethical argument against it that I came across was that it would be a form of instrumentalizing students. This was seen as particularly inappropriate given the responsibilities academics have towards their students. A relatively common conception of instrumentalizing or treating as a mere means is that it is a failure to respect constraints on how to treat others. However, MABing academics do in fact still respect many such constraints. Yet, the salient question is whether they respect constraints sufficiently. I argue that the decisive question for this is how striking workers react to emergency cases caused by the strike and whether there are measures to insure that there is no disproportionate impact on individual members of IPTPs.

My discussion will both help us understand how we should understand the mere means principle, especially when applied to complex, real-world settings that involve multiple groups of agents with potentially conflicting interests, as well as illuminate ethically significant aspects of industrial action.

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